International Cooperation as Interagency Cooperation: Examples from Wildlife and Habitat Preservation

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ABSTRACT

International treaties are generally negotiated and signed by national bureaucracies, which may also negotiate and sign agreements with other bureaucracies in the same country. Despite being governed by a single domestic legal system, implementation and enforcement of these domestic agreements are essentially political, just like international cooperation. In short, cooperation between two agencies presents essentially the same problem whether these agencies are found in different countries or in the same country. This similarity is generally overlooked because the issues over which agencies negotiate often differ—defense and trade policy at the international level, transportation or land use at the domestic level.

Demonstrating the analytical similarity of international cooperation to interagency cooperation therefore requires holding issue area constant while allowing interstate and intrastate units to vary. To do this, I focus on cooperation over wildlife and habitat preservation at three levels of government in the US and Canada: federal, state, and tribal. I explain this variation in cooperation in a simple theory in which agency goals and certain features of habitats interact. Variation between successful and unsuccessful cooperation in this issue area is governed solely by characteristics of the habitat and agency goals, and does not depend on whether a problem is "international" or "domestic."

Thinking of international cooperation as a form of interagency cooperation should change the way we analyze international cooperation. For scholars who think in terms of nation-states interacting either in an anarchic international system, this points to a very different unit of analysis. For those who emphasize the domestic politics of international cooperation, this moves us away from executives constrained by legislatures to look at sub-units within each executive, perhaps acting as delegates of a legislative principal.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, March 2007. I am grateful to Ken Cousins and Doug Dion for insightful comments.

International treaties are generally negotiated and signed by national bureaucracies. Defense ministries negotiate military agreements, education ministries negotiation educational exchanges, and so forth.

This simple fact has wider implications for our study of international cooperation than scholars have previously recognized. National bureaucracies also negotiate agreements, such as memoranda of understanding, with one another. Despite being governed by a single domestic legal system, implementation and enforcement of these domestic agreements are essentially political. Simply put, the US National Park Service (Department of the Interior) and the US Forest Service (Department of Agriculture) do not sue each other over violations of any agreement ("Judicial Resolution" 1980; see also Keiter 1988). They only rarely refer disputes to a higher political level—the President—because the demands on any president's time are too great. Monitoring and enforcement are political, not legal, problems for these agencies.

This is little different than, say, an agreement between two transportation ministries concerning a road or rail link between their respective countries. These bodies also do not bring legal action against one another in the case of a dispute but instead try to solve disagreements politically. Only rarely will disputes be brought to a higher political level, such as a prime minister or legislature's budget committee, for resolution. International dispute resolution may or may not be available, but in any case these ministries avoid bringing legal disputes against one another.

In short, cooperation between two agencies presents essentially the same problem whether these agencies are found in different countries or in the same country. This claim extends insights from Graham Allison's (1969) bureaucratic politics approach to treat

interagency and international cooperation as fundamentally similar to each other. Allison, in contrast, conceived as interagency politics as something that determined the policy of a "state" interacting with other "states" in a different sphere (not unlike Putnam 1988). Phrased differently, the approach here aims at a fuller account of international/interagency relations instead of a theory of foreign policy in a single state.

The similarity between interagency cooperation and international cooperation is generally overlooked because the issues over which agencies negotiate often differ. For example, the defense agencies of the US and Canada negotiate over missile defense, while the states of Massachusetts and California do not. While the discipline conventionally assumes that "international relations" is different than "interagency relations," these differences may simply reflect the fact that defense policy and education policy differ *as issues*. A long tradition examining different kinds of issue areas (Lowi 1972 is the *locus classicus*) gives this alternative view some plausibility.

This paper will argue that if we hold other relevant variables constant, variation in "cooperation" does not depend on the nature of the units involved (nation-states, domestic agencies, etc.). Variation in cooperation also does not depend on whether two actors cooperate across an international boundary. To show this, I hold issue area and other variables constant while allowing interstate and intrastate units to vary, ideally using a theory that can explain variation in cooperation using variables other than the nature of the unit. Thus, the paper involves testing a theory of TBC while also testing the claim that the theory works equally well across national boundaries as within them. For reasons developed below, I will focus on relations within and between Canada and the United States, but the analysis can be tested against other countries.

This study also requires an issue area that is "scalable," that is, an issue that falls within the jurisdiction of government units both large and small. Many environmental issues share these characteristics, being regulated both locally and internationally while also crossing jurisdictional boundaries. Wildlife, which does not recognize human boundaries and which may cross boundaries in either or both directions, provides an excellent subject for this study. Land management questions related to wildlife, such as habitat preservation or ecosystem management, raise similar problems and provide a related topic of study here. Cooperation over wildlife management and habitat preservation may occur at three levels of government in the US and Canada: federal, state/provincial, and tribal. The Crown of the Continent Ecosystem (COCE) along the southern borders of British Columbia and Alberta and the northern borders of Idaho and Montana provide the international focus for this study. Comparable domestic problems in the Rockies, especially around the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem (GYE), provide non-international controls. Focusing on a single issue area in a constrained area holds constant the differences across issues and focus on the question of political units. This focus also makes it possible to present a single theory of transboundary cooperation in that issue area that applies across all levels of government in that issue area.

I explain variation in cooperation across all these settings with a simple theory in which agency goals and certain features of habitats interact. Variation between successful and unsuccessful cooperation in this issue area is governed solely by characteristics of the habitat and agency goals, and does not depend on whether a problem is "international" or "domestic." The scope of the theory is limited, however, by looking solely at the presence or absence of transboundary cooperation, and not the substance of any TBC agreement concluded. Domestic and international TBC may therefore differ in some detail not captured by the research design

here.

Thinking of international cooperation as a form of interagency cooperation should change the way we analyze international cooperation. For scholars who think in terms of nation-states interacting either in an anarchic international system (Waltz 1956, 1979) or in an international society (Bull 1977; Barnett and Finnemore 2004), this points to a very different unit of analysis—the agency, not the "state." This approach also suggests a recasting of the nature of "anarchy," and questions the extent to which the political and legal framework between the US Departments of Interior or Agriculture differs from the environment faced between the National Park Service and Parks Canada. For those who emphasize the domestic politics of international cooperation (Evans et al., eds. 1993; Milner 1997; Pahre 2007), the analysis here moves us away from executives constrained by legislatures to look at sub-units within each executive, perhaps acting as delegates of a legislative principal. The study of international cooperation need not *assume* that the adjective "international" has any causal importance at all; indeed, this study of interagency cooperation would suggest that the burden of proof be imposed on those who believe the adjective *is* important.

Why *might* international politics differ from national politics?

Before examining how international boundaries do not change the basic transboundary problem, we should consider several plausible reasons why the category of "international" might play a key role in TBC problems. The foremost reason why international TBC may differ from domestic TBC is the problem of anarchy, and the related issue of sovereignty (Waltz 1979 is the *locus classicus*). "Anarchy" refers to the lack of any international government or legal system with the power to make legally binding, authoritative commands to the units (states) in the

international system. These states are thus externally sovereign, in that no external actor can give them binding instructions. Though it need not follow logically, these states are also internally sovereign in that each has ultimate legal authority to issue binding commands within its territory. In this framework, then, there is a very large qualitative difference between interactions within a country and interactions across national boundaries.

As a result of this difference, Realists and many others argue that cooperation across international boundaries will be more difficult than cooperation within national boundaries for two reasons. First, they argue, the international system lacks a legal order that can enforce TBC agreements, while domestic systems are characterized by such orders. This difference can easily be overstated, however. Compare for example the legal structure available to the European Commission if it wishes to force a member state to carry out an EU directive with that available to the National Park Service (NPS) and United States Forest Service (USFS), should these agencies need to enforce an agreement between them. The Commission can, and does, bring legal action to compel implementation, and states almost always comply because they wish to retain the dense network of cooperation within the EU. In contrast, by long-standing policy and (almost) law, the NPS and USFS do not bring suit against one another. It seems that the United States, and not the international system, is "anarchic" in such a case.

Second, many analysts argue that the international system relies on "self-help," forcing each state to pursue military and economic power as a means to ensure its own security and continued existence. This makes international cooperation more difficult because states worry not only about the absolute gains from any agreement but also about each state's share of those gains. Letting the other side gain more than you risks letting a potential opponent increase in power over you. Certainly such concerns may play an important role in issue areas such as arms

control. However, trade cooperation poses risks for security only under highly-constrained conditions (see Morrow 1997), and in an issue such as wildlife preservation the security externalities must be vanishingly small. This suggests that issue area, and not anarchy, poses the key analytical distinction. My argument below uses wildlife and habitat preservation as an issue that isolates the key international/domestic distinction to determine whether it truly matters analytically.

Anarchy does contribute to another challenge for international TBC, the weaker institutional framework available to would-be cooperators (Mitchell 1999). Neo-liberal theorists of international relations have argued that institutions and institutional networks can make cooperation easier by reducing the transaction costs of future negotiations (Keohane 1984). The argument is plausible enough. For example, Chester (2006) shows that the network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the Sonoran desert and the Yellowstone-to-Yukon region show significant weaknesses, especially across the US-Mexican border. Even so, purely domestic NGO networks also exhibit many weaknesses, and Chester also shows that umbrella organizations can strengthen these links both domestically and internationally. This suggests that the key variable is "institutionalization" and not "international/domestic," and we should analyze the problem as such.

In addition to the problems of anarchy and sovereignty, we can image other reasons why international TBC might differ from national TBC. Some have argued that international environmental problems are characterized by much larger scales than domestic environmental problems (i.e., Mitchell 1999). Clearly, this is usually true but it need not be true. To take one salient comparison, the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem is about 7.7 million hectares in size, while the three Benelux countries are only about 7.4 million hectares. Even if the scale of a

problem is correlated with whether a problem is international, surely it would be better to study the variable "scale" directly instead of making causal claims about the variable "international." Though it is not central to my argument, the cases in this paper also suggest that scale does not matter within some ranges, as caribou and elk or bison migrations differ by an order of magnitude without affecting the likelihood of successful TBC.

Finally, some have proposed that cultural heterogeneity makes international cooperation more difficult than intranational cooperation because of differences in understanding and communication (Mitchell 1999). Again, this is a plausible claim. My research design largely holds cultural heterogeneity constant by looking only at the US and Canada—two countries with significant cultural differences between them but also significant internal cultural differences from, say, British Columbia to Nunavut to Québec or Conneticut to Hawaii to Wyoming. In one case below (caribou) the cultural differences within each country are exactly mirrored in the other (i.e., ethnically European environmentalists and hunters, Native Alaskans/First Nations, state and federal governments). I did not find that intranational cultural heterogeneity made TBC more or less difficult, and in the caribou case international cultural heterogeneity is smaller than the internal differences.

For each of these arguments, then, there is a plausible claim that scholars have misspecified the problem. Rather than international/domestic being the central causal variable, variation in issue area, scope, institutionalization or preference heterogeneity may be more important.

Examining my claims requires that I hold these other variables constant to the extent possible. I also need to focus on a dependent variable that is found at both the international and domestic level, a need that "transboundary cooperation" serves admirably. I will follow the

definition of "cooperation" found in international relations, cases in which two actors jointly agree to change their actions in some policy area, each condition on the other (Keohane 1984: 51-52). This concept applies as easily to the US and Canada as to the NPS and USFS.

Theory of transboundary cooperation

To study TBC both within and across national boundaries, I focus on land-management agencies. Most of these, such as the NPS and USFS, are simply land managers. Other agencies, such as the US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) straddle this definition—as manager of national wildlife refuges (NWRs) the USFWS is a land manager, but it is also a regulatory agency responsible the endangered species act (ESA) and other legislation by which it regulates other agencies' lands (see Keiter and Locke 1996).[1]

Land managers, whether federal, state or tribal, manage land. When managing their land, they follow a set of rules, or mandate, telling the managers what objectives to pursue. Other goals will doubtless also affect managers' decision, such as budget or staff maximization, but I will not discuss those in this paper. Though important, these latter goals are common to all agencies and therefore do not help explain variation in interagency cooperation.

In the narrower case of wildlife management, mangers will have preferences over the number of animals of each managed species, and may also have preferences over natural processes. For example, some managers intervene actively to ensure that parasitic or predator-prey processes occur in their land, some have active fire management policies, while others choose not to intervene at all ("natural regulation"). Important as those processes are, I will set

[1]The USFWS may also provide animals from one site for reintroduction at a second, more distant site, another interesting topic that falls outside TBC as defined here because only the recipient agency changes its land management policy in a species reintroduction.

these issues aside here, and assume more simply that managers care about the number of animals they manage.

Wildlife numbers may be important for a variety of reasons. State game management agencies, for example, manage game species to ensure a large but harvest for hunters, at a level that will remain sustainable over time. Managers of endangered species seek a population above some target threshold, and in many cases seek to maximize the number of animals so as to obtain a surplus for reintroduction elsewhere. Other land mangers want to reduce animal populations. For example, the states of Idaho and Wyoming want to reduce or eliminate politically controversial wolves and, to a lesser extent, grizzly bears. Most prairie states want fewer black-tailed prairie dogs, which they (mistakenly) believe compete with cattle for fodder. National park and forest managers occasionally reduce oversize ungulate populations, especially where native predators have been extirpated.

Wildlife management problems only become transboundary wildlife management problems if the animals in question cross boundaries. Isolated populations of, say, boreal toads (Bufo boreas boreas) in the Central Rockies may not pose such issues, but larger animals certainly do. For TBC problems, we can reduce managers' possibly complex preferences over populations to simple preferences over wildlife crossing boundaries (see Pahre 2006 for a fuller analysis). Any given manager will either want an increase in immigration, an increase in emigration, or no change at all (this latter possibility includes managers who wish not to intervene at all). For simplicity, I call those that want an increase in animals moving into their land the "more" type, and those managers that want an decrease in animals moving into their land (equivalently, an increase in animals moving out) the "less" type. This captures well the situation for land units whose animals emigrate or immigrate permanently, since net emigration

is the relevant variable. For migratory species, where the same animals return, more-type preferences imply that the manager wants a larger population, with greater numbers of emigrants *and* immigrants, which are the same animals at different points in time. Managers with less-type preferences over migratory species simply want fewer animals.

Managers with identical goals may have either compatible or incompatible interests. Immigration into one's own land unit may come at the expense of adjacent land managers who also wish to increase immigration into their unit. In the case of migratory species, however, joint management would increase the animals available to both land units. Thus, land managers' preferences over animal movements at the boundary provide only part of the explanation for variation in TBC. The other part of the explanation depends on the ways in which wildlife populations in the two land units are connected. I will consider two possibilities, a migratory relationship and a source-sink relationship. In a migratory relationship, the animals in one land unit move to another land unit for a season, and then return. In such a case, the two managers are jointly managing the population and, as I will discuss below, these common interests generally create favorable conditions for TBC.

In a source-sink relationship, one particularly productive habitat (the "source") regularly produces surplus animals. When the population exceeds the land's carrying capacity, surplus animals from this source disperse elsewhere in search of food and/or unoccupied breeding sites (Pulliam 1988). The "sink" habitats would not be productive enough to maintain their current population if they were fenced off from the world, but these sinks can maintain a stable population as long as they can receive a regular inflow of animals from adjacent sources. This stylization abstracts from the diversity of habitats found in any landscape, especially the fragmented landscapes in and around human settlement, but it serves as a reasonable first cut at a

fuller characterization of the interconnections between habitat units.

Manager preferences and habitat relationships interact in a straightforward way. Consider first the case in which both land managers want more of a given animal, and therefore want an increase in immigration into (or decrease in emigration out of) their land unit. In a source-sink setting, these managers will not cooperate because they find themselves in a zero-sum game: any increase in immigration into the sink comes at the expense of the population in the source. Even when the source has its target number of animals, TBC will be difficult because the source agency will be satisfied with the status quo.

In contrast, two managers with more-type preferences will cooperate easily when they manage migratory animals. Here, increases in the summer (breeding) population will also increase the number of animals that return to the winter population, and increases in the winter population will also increase the summer population.

Because more-type preferences are by far the most common in the North American setting, the predictions are simple. TBC will occur with more-type preferences in a migratory setting because managers have the same interests. TBC will not occur with more-type preferences in a source-sink setting because managers have different interests.

The outcomes in the other logical possibilities follow easily from the same analysis. If both managers of migratory habitats want fewer animals, TBC will again be easy because the managers have the same preferences. Reducing the wintering population will reduce the summer population, and vice versa. TBC will be hard for two less-type managers in a source-sink setting because each manager will want to encourage emigration into the other manager's unit.

When the managers have different preferences, cooperation is likely for source-sink relationships but not for migratory units. In the migratory setting, the managers have directly

opposed interests and TBC will not occur. In a source-sink setting, asymmetry can make TBC possible. A less-type manager of a source habitat who wants to encourage emigration has the same interests as an adjacent sink manager with more-type who wants to encourage immigration, so TBC should occur. However, if the source manager has more-type preferences and wants to discourage emigration, there is little scope for TBC with an adjacent sink manager with less-type who wants to encourage emigration because the sink does not have surplus animals to disperse. Table 1 summarizes my predictions across all logical possibilities.

Table 1
Incentives for Transboundary Cooperation

	Habitat Relationship	
Manager Goals	Source-Sink	Migratory
Same (both "more" or both "less")	No	Yes
Different	Depends*	No
*TBC if the source wants an increased emigration into the sink but not if the source wants a decrease in emigration.		

As promised in the introduction, the theory makes no reference to the nature of the units. Whether land managers are provincial parks, national forests, Indian reservations or the Department of Defense should make no difference whatsoever. These agencies will have a variety of goals, of course. Yet the TBC problem depends more narrowly on their preferences at the border of their lands. Once we collapse these preferences into more-type and less-type goals, the effects on TBC occur regardless of the unit.

Because I assume that each habitat has a unique land manager, I neglect the interests of "overlay" wildlife managers such as the USFWS in its role as executive of the Endangered Species Act, which gives it some powers over management actions taken by the NPS, USFS, and

other primary land managers. The USFWS role as primary manager of National Wildlife Refuges (NWRs) complicates analysis further if the NWR engages in TBC with a non-USFWS unit. Even so, the approach here could predict the circumstances under which regional management by several NWRs (i.e., TBC) will be more or less difficult.

Second, we must note that the theory concerns only the presence or absence of cooperation, and not the policy content of any agreement. Clearly the content of agreements is important, but it is much more difficult to compare this content systematically in the wildlife context—as opposed to, say, trade policy where tariffs can be measured in a fairly straightforward way (Pahre 1997).

A third point also requires clarification to define the scope of transboundary *cooperation* as defined here. Given the theory here, I look only at policy change and not information sharing (see *inter alia* Dai 2002). Information sharing has a somewhat different logic than the policy cooperation here—for example, a less-type source and more-type sink would be able to exchange information even though policy coordination would be difficult (or irrelevant). Analyzing such problems requires an extension of the theory in future research. In addition, the literature on international cooperation regularly maintains that information exchange is a relatively low form of cooperation.

Interestingly, this simple theory also contributes to our understanding of TBC. Professional biologists and managers regularly lament the lack of transboundary coordination in many areas, typically calling for greater goodwill, less "divisiveness," efforts to develop a shared vision, and/or more political will in order to improve TBC (i.e., Agee and Johnson 1988; Bergin et al. 2005; Darakas 2002; McGlade 2002; Maehr 2004; Sax and Keiter 1987; Van Harten 2002; Varley 1988). Only a few scholars have identified agency mandates as an important effect on the

success or failure of TBC. For example, Porter and Underwood (1999) argue that the US National Park Service mandate seeks to limit human impact on natural areas, while state game agencies seek to exert human control over wildlife populations, goals that are inherently contradictory. Even those that have identified mandates have not teased out the general pattern examined here.

In short, the theory develops a straightforward explanation of variation in TBC that depends solely on preferences and habitats without reference to whether these problems of cooperation are national or international. Evaluating these claims requires that we consider both the theoretical explanation of TBC and the assertion that the nature of the units does *not* explain TBC. This is the task of the next two sections.

Research design

This paper will test two sets of claims based on the above analysis—both the theoretical explanation of TBC and my claim that the nature of the unit does not matter. Ideally, we would have a database of all cases of possible TBC. This is currently unrealistic, and it is very difficult to identify cases of TBC that should occur but have not. To limit the domain, I will consider only TBC problems from the Greater Yellowstone Ecosytem (GYE) in the south into Canada. To limit attention to politically-salient species, I will focus on mammals and birds because amphibians, insects and plants have very little political or cultural importance (Metrick and Weitzman 1998). The only important exclusion here is salmon, which is an issue mostly limited to the coastal states and provinces, and whose commercial nature would require a different analysis of agency goals.

For testing my claim about the non-importance of the nature of the unit, US and Canada

provide excellent variation across all levels of government. They are strongly federal systems that also have significant First Nations (Indian tribes) playing roles in the wildlife management issue area (on tribal roles in general, see Durham 2000). There is also a clear policy need for cooperation in wildlife management, especially for larger mammals and many migratory species. Many carnivore and ungulate populations are found in islands isolated from one another, with a concomitant increase in the risk of local extinction (Newmark 1987). Both gray wolves and grizzly bears, for example, are found in Yellowstone and Glacier National Parks but are not established in the approximately 400 miles of territory between these parks. Even large-scale protected areas such as national parks may be insufficient for the long-term survival of most carnivore species (Newmark 1987; Noss et al. 1996); for example, Canada's southern national parks are too small, and experience too many visitors, to sustain minimum viable populations of large carnivores (Landry et al. 2001). Managing these populations properly requires transboundary cooperation, which under my definition would require that Canada and the United States (or other units) change what they are doing, conditional on the other unit also changing its actions in some way. As I will show, this cooperation often does not happen, despite a recognized need for it, and this provides a useful variation in the dependent variable.

The cases here are largely illustrative, and intended to show the causal mechanisms at work in explaining variation in TBC. As appropriate in such cases (King et al. 1994; Pahre 2005), I select cases to provide variation in the independent variables of habitat type, manager goals, and nature of the units. By taking all cases from a restricted domain of US-Canadian mammals and birds in the "Northern Rockies" (southern Rockies for Canadians), I minimize the possibility of biased sampling.

Determining whether agency goals are "same" or "different" can pose some challenges.

The theory does not require that we compare the agencies' actual mandates, only their preferences over transboundary migration. Agencies that want a larger population of the target species want more immigration (or, equivalently, less emigration), and will therefore have more-type preferences. This will be true even for agencies that manage hunting on their lands, since increased immigration makes possible a larger harvest. Most of the land management agencies in the region analyzed here have these "more" type preferences in that they want more animals than they currently have.[2] Only a few agencies want to reduce their populations, though some agencies managing severely overpopulated ungulates want to reduce their population by culling or out-migration. Some types of agencies also seek to reduce or eliminate politically undesirable species such as wolves, prairie dogs, and sometimes grizzly bears, among others.

As a guide to case selection, Table 2 shows the relevant independent variables (manager goals, habitat relationship, and nature of the unit), and the prediction of the theory for each permutation of variables. The table also lists those TBC cases from the Northern Rockies domain that I will discuss in the next section. Because less-type preferences are unusual for most managers, it has proved hard to find international cases in which managers have different goals. This means that the TBC predictions can be tested across all manager and habitat types, but the claims about the nature of the units depend on cases in which both managers have more-type preferences. Because these cases include variation in the predicted outcomes across habitat types, regardless of unit, these cases suffice to demonstrate that variation depends on the variables found in the theory and not on the nature of the units.

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[2]To clarify, "more" preferences does not mean "unconditionally more, no matter how many animals we have" but simply "more animals than we have" and "more animals through the range of possible TBC outcomes."

Table 2
Variation in Transboundary Cooperation: Cases

Manager Goals	Habitat Relationship	Predict	International	Domestic
Same	Source-Sink	No	Listed mammal species (wolves, grizzlies, lynx)	Blackfoot IR nongame (grizzlies)
Same	Migratory	Yes	Migratory birds	Jackson Hole elk
Different	Source-Sink	Depends	[Examples lacking]	Yes: controversial species*
Different	Migratory	No	[Examples lacking]	Blackfoot IR game (elk)
*Requires that source managers want to reduce dispersion of bison, wolves, and grizzlies for political reasons.				

Case studies

To examine the theoretical claims, this section reviews a series of cases chosen as described above. Each case describes the manager goals, nature of the habitat, and whether the outcome is consistent with the theory. For most cases, I also briefly consider some alternative explanations as a form of control. Taken as a whole, the cases clearly demonstrate that the theoretical variables, and not the nature of the units, determine outcomes.

International source-sink, same goals: no cooperation. The US-Canadian border is characterized by a large number of source-sink relationships. Several highly-visible mammals were extirpated, or nearly so, south of the border—including wolves, grizzly (brown) bears, Canada lynx, and others possibly including the wolverine (about which little is known). In most of these cases, the animal remains fairly abundant in much of Canada. Some Canadian animals have dispersed into the United States over the last few decades, establishing foothold populations in the Northern Rockies and North Cascades. The current situation seems to recapitulate the successful dispersion of gray wolves out of the Quetico-Boundary Waters source into the upper Midwest, where the Wisconsin and some other populations remain sinks.

In each of these cases, US recovery efforts would benefit from TBC. If Canada were to manage border areas to increase animal production, for example, more animals would disperse into the US. Useful forms of cooperation could be as simple as prohibiting hunting in Canadian lands adjacent to targeted US regions. As it stands, hunting is sometimes prohibited in border districts for game management or public safety reasons, as in E.C. Manning Provincial Park, but these decisions reflect provincial goals and not any cooperation across boundaries. When populations increase to a level that will allow sustainable hunting, the provinces generally allow hunting regardless of the implications for the US population.

Despite the benefits, the US and Canada do not cooperate in any way to manage these populations jointly. All the agencies involved have the same goals, an influx of animals into their lands. The reasons differ—American land managers seek species recovery, while Canadian managers generally want a larger game animal population base for hunters in the most populous southern parts of the country. For example, BC allows hunting and trapping of wolves, wolverines, cougars and black bears, among other species, most of which are of interest to adjacent US land managers. Even for non-game animals, none of the Canadian mangers have goals involving increased emigration out of their land units. As a result, cooperative land management does not occur.

Interestingly, the lack of cooperation does not depend on whether the population source is located in the US or Canada. For example, grizzly bears in this region may better be described as having a US-based source in Glacier NP and population sinks in Waterton Lakes NP and adjacent areas in Alberta and southeast BC. When population levels permit, Alberta in particular has allowed grizzly hunting. This keeps populations at an unsustainable level, dependent on immigration from the US source. Indeed, the Canadian agencies doe not even cooperate with

one another, as grizzly expert Brian Horejsi (1989: 222-3) describes:

> Grizzly bears in southwestern Alberta, despite their threatened status, are being killed or removed at a rate far greater than that in either Montana or British Columbia. This high level of mortality occurs without apparent regard for the international status of the population, without noticeable recognition of the bear's special status in the United States, and without due consideration of the regional role of Waterton and Glacier National Parks.

Horejsi has estimated an annual grizzly harvest in southwest Alberta of about 4 a year out of a population of 30-50, while he estimates that the population requires about 175 bears to be sustainable (Horejsi 2004; see also Kansas 2002; Keiter and Locke 1996

In the face of such evidence, it would be all too easy to attribute the lack of TBC to Canadians' reluctance to relinquish any sovereignty to international organizations. In this context, it is important to note that various agencies do exchange information about some listed species. For example, Canada's Rocky Mountain Grizzly Bear Planning Committee (RMGBPC), formed in 1997, makes advisory recommendations to wildlife ministers in BC and Alberta, and to the federal minister responsible for the national parks (Kansas 2002: 25-26). The RMGBPC includes some Americans who provide information to Canadians, but they have no legal standing in either US or Canadian policy making.

The US and Canada also cooperate in some areas that do not involve land management. The 1973 Convention on Trade in Endangered Species, for example, prevents trade in listed animals, furs, and other parts. The two countries also signed a "Framework for Cooperation between the U.S. Department of the Interior and Environment Canada in the Protection and Recovery of Wild Species at Risk" in 1997. This provides a legal framework for future cooperation, though it has not led to any such cooperation within the domain here.

Domestic source-sink, same goals: no cooperation. In the same region as in the international case, the Blackfoot Indian Reservation also manages significant numbers of wildlife. Bordering both Canada and Glacier NP, Blackfoot IR is home to the largest of the three tribes of the Blackfoot Nation, with also includes two small tribes in Alberta. Like its neighbor Glacier NP, Blackfoot IR lies at the intersection of prairie and mountain and is home to many species familiar to each ecosystem. In this sub section, I will analyze dispersing animals such as grizzly bears, wolves, and swift foxes, with migratory elk discussed in a later subsection.

The tribal government's wildlife management goals vary. In the case of game animals, it seeks first to provide hunting opportunities for tribal members, and then to earn revenue from trophy hunting by outsiders. For these species, Blackfoot IR seeks increased immigration, most of which comes from Glacier NP, making this a source-sink relationship. Its interests in nongame animals depend on both cultural and economic motives. For example, the endangered swift fox is culturally important to the Blackfoot Nation. In addition, Blackfoot IR has received grants from government and non-government sources for swift fox recovery programs, revenue that helps support the tribal fish and wildlife department.. Other culturally important species include black-footed ferrets and black-tailed prairie dogs.

The reservation's neighbors also seek larger populations of the animals considered here, especially listed (or once-listed) species such as grizzlies and wolves. More typically, both tribal members and fee-paying outsiders cluster near the boundary in the hunting season order to shoot animals from Glacier NP as they exit the park. A hunting brochure for the Nation makes this connection explicit for the Boulder Flat Top area, where the "abundant wildlife of Glacier Park wander out onto the mountain front and prairies of the Reservation, making this area prime hunting destination" (Brochure 2005). The most lucrative species is grizzly bear, for which the

tribe opened a non-member trophy season in Fall 2006, charging $50,000 per license (personal communication)—much to the consternation of the National Park Service.

There would be a clear benefit from TBC, since these species are quite wide-ranging and require very large regions to support a sustainable population. Despite this, the reservation and the national park find it very difficult to cooperate on joint management of anything. (They have, after years of disagreement, reached a modus operandi in presenting the history and culture of the region.) The failure of cooperation is clearly consistent with the theory here.

An alternative explanation would be the poor relations between many Indian reservations and other units of government, reflecting a long and tragic history. As Ashley and Hubbard (2004: 4) note, intergovernmental relations involving tribal governments "are often characterized by mistrust, anger, frustration, and fear." Relations are particularly poor with state governments, since most states assert that their common-law ownership of wildlife extends also to reservation lands (Goble and Freyfogle 2002: Chapter 7; O'Gara and Morrison 2004), though state wildlife management has been less important for the Blackfoot IR than for other reservations. We will see below that TBC does occur between federal agencies and tribal governments, however, so the real task is to explain variation and not the admittedly low average level of cooperation. Some of this variation depends on internal tribal politics, especially the common alternation in power of traditionalists and modernizers (for Montana, see Lopach et al. 1990/1998).

These issues of internal tribal politics have been more important for the issue of swift fox reintroduction. Because there are not yet any adjacent swift fox populations, TBC is not an issue for that species, but here too the tribe would seek increased immigration of foxes. Interestingly for the argument here, the three Blackfoot units have been unable to cooperate in swift fox reintroduction. With support from the Cochrane Ecological Institute and Defenders of Wildlife,

the US tribe ran a reintroduction program from 1998 to 2002. The Canadian reserves are much more densely populated than the US reservation, with more income from agriculture. The Blood (Kainai) tribe was not interested in participating until 2005, when they worked separately with NGOs instead of joining the Blackfoot IR to the south (Benedict 2005; Wilkinson 1999). The North Peigan (Canada) tribe was unable to reach a decision either way despite support from tribal elder Joe Crowfoot, who died in 1998. Thus, intertribal TBC on swift foxes proved impossible as well, despite the likelihood that a sustainable population on the South Peigan (US) lands could have served as a source supporting reintroductions across the border in Canada.

These failures of TBC among the constituent members of the Blackfoot Nation, consistent with the theory here, suggests that the history of mistrust between Blackfoot and white governments is not a necessary condition for non-cooperation. In addition, I will show below that occasional examples of successful TBC occur when the theory predicts that they should.

Domestic source-sink, different goals: outcome varies. As mentioned several times in this paper, less-type preferences are fairly uncommon because most land managers in the Rockies either seek larger animal populations or wish to let natural processes stabilize the population at higher levels than have been common since European contact. The only significant exception to this generalization consist of a group of controversial species, mostly listed as endangered or threatened. In some of these cases, state land management agencies actively reduce the population, by poisoning black-tailed prairie dogs or shooting cougars and coyotes, for example. In the Northern Rockies, gray wolves, grizzly bears, and bison have been the most controversial species—wolves because of a risk to livestock, bears because of seasonal livestock risks and potential danger to humans, and bison because they can infect domestic cattle with brucellosis.

State and provincial agencies, with the partial exception of Montana Fish, Game and Parks, side with livestock owners and wish to extirpate these species from jurisdictions under their control.

In contrast, the adjacent federal land-management agencies generally want larger animal populations. In a source-sink setting, these differences of goals between federal and state agencies can facilitate transboundary cooperation—cooperation that would not occur if the agencies had similar preferences in a source-sink setting.

Bison in Yellowstone NP (YNP) present an interesting case. The population is characterized by a mixture of "migration" from higher to lower elevations and "source-sink" relationships as a healthy bison population disperses outside the park. Further complications ensue because some of the herd remains in the park year-round while some does not, so TBC issues do not always arise. When boundaries do stride across the bison herd's movements, the park's neighbors tend to oppose the entry of bison onto their land, fearing that bison will spread brucellosis to grazing cattle, making the animals largely unsaleable. The NPS wants a healthy bison herd, but to minimize local political opposition to the park it has come to restrict bison emigration out of the park. As a result, YNP's neighbors have less-type preferences over both dispersing and migratory bison. The park itself has more-type preferences over all bison, wanting migratory bison to return each summer while it wants would-be dispersers to remain in the park.

TBC has been very difficult in these settings but the relevant agencies did reach agreement in 2002 (see Clarke et al. 2005; National Park Service et al. 2000). The goal of the agreement is to reduce the brucellosis threat with a mix of techniques: hazing bison to keep them away from cattle grazing areas, fencing some areas, vaccinating some bison, physically moving

some bison, and "management-related mortality" of several hundred bison a year.[3] Each agency sacrificed important parts of its management goals in order to achieve a cooperative solution to the problem, one that continues to attract political controversy on all sides. After regional tribes successfully asserted old treaty rights to hunt bison, the state of Montana also opened up a limited hunt for both Indians and non-Indians (McMillion 2006).

To the south, Jackson Hole bison have posed similar issues. A very small herd lives in Grand Teton NP (GTNP), in an area with some private inholdings and adjacent to ranches that depend on livestock and/or tourism for income. The herd has discovered supplemental elk feeding on the National Elk Refuge (NER), and now migrates to take advantage of this winter fodder. As the herd has grown, it has also dispersed into adjacent areas, include the town of Jackson itself. Dispersing bison are controlled or eliminated, so the TBC problem essentially concerns migration between the NER and GTNP.

The NER has traditionally wanted a lower bison population because it defines its mandate largely in terms of elk. The Wyoming Department of Game and Fish (WDGF) also wants fewer bison, to prevent the spread of brucellosis. GTNP wants a sustainable herd but also wants a herd dependent on natural processes and not supplemental feeding—a fact that creates the possibility of transboundary cooperation by allowing the park to accept a smaller herd. The ultimate result was a 1997 interagency plan, which provides for a self-sustainable population, reducing supplemental feeding, and minimizing contacts between bison and domestic livestock (Cromley 2000b).

Aside from the analysis here, there do not really exist explanations for this cooperation.

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[3]Removing the cattle would be a cheaper solution. Tired of the controversy, at least one local ranch gave up its leases and now grazes elsewhere. Making this solution general would be very difficult politically, however.

It stands out as rather contrary to the usual recommendations of conservation biologists to manage habitat for larger populations. Yet, ironically, these agencies have succeeded in this controversial case but have been unable to achieve TBC in many less-controversial species. The theory here provides a plausible explanation for this variation.

International migratory, same goals: cooperation. In contrast to the international source-sink problem discussed above, management of migratory species has been fairly easy across international boundaries. The oldest Canadian-American wildlife treaty still in effect is the 1916 Migratory Bird Treaty (MBT), signed during a Progressive era that also saw the 1908 Inland Fisheries Treaty and 1911 North Pacific Fur Seal Convention (Dorsey 1998). The MBT addressed the problem of hunters killing migratory birds along their flyways, or in their habitats at either end, thus reducing the total population. This differs from the management problem faced in a habitat sink, where harvest does not affect the productivity of the source habitat. It also differs from hunting in a source habitat, which reduces the population that disperses into adjacent sinks, but does not (necessarily) reduce the source productivity.

The MBT has provided a framework under which US and Canadian land mangers acquire land and manage existing units to further the goals of the act. For example, the establishment of many US national wildlife refuges on international flyways depend on executive powers under this treaty because authorizations based on congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce were less successful. Management mandates reflect this legislative authorization, and migratory birds dominate the US National Wildlife Refuge System (Fischmann 2003; Zawlowsky 1986).

Among those species excluded from the research design here, it is worth noting that US-

Canadian wildlife treaties concern almost entirely migratory and anadromous species: caribou, polar bears, fur seals, and salmon alongside migratory birds. For example, both the US and Canada are obliged to protect transboundary populations of polar bears under the International Polar Bear Convention (1976). The other treaties contemporary with the MBT also address migratory species. Fur seals are essentially migratory, moving between island breeding grounds owned mostly by the US and the high seas available to hunters from any country. Though I have not analyzed them as a separate type here, many inland fisheries share many characteristics of joint production with migratory habitats, and we would expect cooperation to occur when managers have the same preferences.

Standard neo-liberal theories of international cooperation would seem to explain the MBT case well: it is symmetric and both parties are better off cooperating than not cooperating. There is some risk from defection if one country fears the other will harvest all the animals first, as was the case before the Fur Seal Convention. The theory here provides a similar explanation, one that is more satisfactory in that it also explains cases of non-cooperation, such as international source-sink problems. It can also be extended to other, non-international problems, as in the next section.

Domestic migratory, same goals: cooperation. In contrast to the politically controversial species discussed in several cases here, elk are politically popular. For that reason, elk managers generally have more-type preferences, though on some overpopulated ranges managers would like elk to disperse to adjacent lands. As a migratory species that moves between winter and summer ranges in the GYE, we would expect successful TBC as all managers have similar interests. Again, there is a small complication in that many elk remain inside Yellowstone for

the winter, but herd in the south of the GYE all migrates to the NER and poses a TBC problem.

Such TBC occurs in several fora. The Commission on the Conservation of Elk of Jackson Hole, Wyoming, ran from 1927 to 1935, including both government agencies and non-government participants. After two decades of less formal coordination, the agencies formed the Jackson Hole Cooperative Elk Studies Group in 1958, which is still in operation (Clark 2000: 178).

At the ecosystem level, the Greater Yellowstone Coordinating Committee (GYCC) consists of the relevant federal land managers in the GYE, as well as the relevant regional directors of the NPS and USFS (that is, the land managers' bosses). Since its founding in 1964, it has met twice yearly to discuss policy coordination, share information, and agree on action. Success has varied significantly by species, but elk management (along with cutthroat trout and bald eagles) is one of the success stories. The GYCC and its Greater Yellowstone Elk Working Group, along with its predecessor Jackson Hole Cooperative Elk Studies Group, have overseen a quadrupling of the elk herd in the region.

That very success has led to widespread concern that there are now too many elk, and agency preferences have moved toward less-type preferences instead of more-type preferences. Though the transition has sometimes been difficult because different agencies changed their interests at different paces, the end result has been renewed TBC around a newer set of goals. The USFWS and WDGF drew up an agreement in 1975 to manage a smaller herd. WDGF was responsible for reducing the herd to 7500 through hunting licenses, while the USFWS (at the NER) would continue to provide supplemental feeding, though moving to a more dispersed forage system fed by in-ground sprinklers (Halverson 2000). This agreement never really reduced the herd, which grew as large as 11,000 head. This failure largely reflects the fact that

the two agencies had different goals because the WDGF did not really want to reduce the herd. The agreement also failed to resolve the key underlying issue, that supplemental winter feeding on the NER provides a breeding ground for brucellosis, which is found at only very low levels in other elk herds. To force a better solution of this issue, the NER denied WDGF permission to vaccinate the herd on NER land in the winter of 1998.

Cooperation among federal agencies, in contrast, to state-federal cooperation, has proceeded apace. In recent years the USFWS and NPS have drawn up a new plan for managing elk on the National Elk Refuge and the adjacent Grand Teton NP (National Elk Refuge 2007). Interestingly for the theory here, both agencies' preferences have changed to less-type preferences, in that each would like to see a smaller elk herd. The current proposal involves a modest reduction of the herd by reducing supplemental feeding on the refuge and changing various practices elsewhere in the ecosystem. Since the agencies continue to have the same preferences as one another, TBC has continued through the shift in preferences over time. When compared to case of unsuccessful elk TBC such as Glacier-Blackfoot, the variation in this case adds plausibility to the overall analysis here.

Domestic migratory, different goals: no cooperation. The eastern half of Glacier NP was purchased from the Blackfoot Indians in 1895, who reserved hunting, fishing and timber rights as long as the land remained "public." When these lands became a national park in 1910, the US maintained that they were no longer "public" but had in fact been withdrawn from public registry and sale. The Blackfoot never accepted this claim, and continued to hunt in what was now a national park (Burnham 2000), despite regular prosecutions for poaching. The land had been, only a generation earlier, Blackfoot land, and the meat long remained important to winter

survival.

In this environment it is not surprising that the tribe and NPS found it very difficult to cooperate on elk management. In terms of the theory here, the outcome depended on different preferences—the tribe wanted a smaller population moving from winter grounds on the reservation to summer grounds in the park, while the NPS wanted a larger population in both seasonal movements.

The elimination of predators such as wolves and grizzly bears in the 1930s ultimately changed NPS preferences. Eventually, elk overpopulated the range and caused significant damage to other park resources. The NPS decided to reduce the herd, giving it the same interest as the Blackfoot. The peak of cooperation came in 1962, when the park hired four tribal members as Seasonal Park Rangers to cull the herd. These seasonal rangers "accidentally" harassed a large number of elk across the park boundary, where a group of Blackfoot hunters happened to be waiting. After the hunters killed 86 elk that day, a shadow fell over future cooperation. The explanation for subsequent non-cooperation makes sense in terms of both neoliberal theory and the theory here: with a small shadow of the future, the Blackfoot had an incentive to defect, sparking NPS retaliation in the form of future non-cooperation.

Soon thereafter, native predators began to return to the region. As elk numbers returned to a naturally regulated level, the incentives for TBC again disappeared. The interaction between preferences and habitat type neatly explains the variation in this case.

Missing cases: international migratory, different goals; and international source-sink, different goals. The Rocky Mountain domain lacks cases in for two permutations of the independent variables, international cases in which managers have different goals, regardless of habitat. The

lack of cases reflects the fact that less-type preferences tend be uncommon. When free to look across many domestic problems, I could find such cases, but when constrained by the necessity of finding problems across an international boundary these cases are rare.

These missing cases complicate our inference a bit. The various domestic cases presented here suffice to demonstrate the usefulness of the theory of TBC, which does not depend on the nature of the units. My second claim is that the presence of an international boundary does not affect the TBC problem. Comparison of the domestic and international same-goal cases above suffices to demonstrate this claim, at least for a subset of the domain of all wildlife TBC problems.

Conclusions

This paper has analyzed international cooperation and interagency in tandem to explain variation in cooperation in wildlife, wildlife habitat, and wilderness management along the US-Canadian borders as well as neighboring regions within each country. I have focused narrowly on the presence or absence of TBC, as opposed to the substance of such cooperation. Certainly the forms of elk and bison TBC in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem have attracted significant controversy on all sides, but that is a question for a different paper.

Variation in decision rules and habitats point to a poorly-understood issue in the theory of international cooperation, and by extension also in the analysis of interagency coordination: variation between symmetric and asymmetric settings. Agencies managing migratory animals face a symmetric problem as both must work together to guarantee survival of the migrating population. When one agency manages a source and another agency manages a sink, the situation is asymmetric. Such asymmetries are ubiquitous in international environmental

problems. Acid rain, for example, originates in the US and Germany but affects downwind forests and water in Canada and Scandinavia. By examining issue areas that vary in terms of symmetry and asymmetry, it would be easy to extend the analysis here to non-wildlife problems.

Moving beyond environmental issues, my central claim is that international cooperation does not occur between "states," or even between "executives constrained by legislatures," but between agencies. Empirically, the theory shows that interagency coordination and international cooperation represent similar processes and should be analyzed similarly. I show this with reference to cooperation in wildlife habitat management both within and across national boundaries. Variation in successful transboundary coordination (TBC) reflects not the nature of the boundary, whether national, state/provincial, tribal or executive agency, but the nature of the wildlife populations being managed and the decision rules of the agencies managing them.

The argument contributes to a wider agenda in the field of international relations, one more oriented toward the politics of subnational units. Where once scholars saw a Realist world in which life was nasty, brutish, and short, much of the field of international relations now sees a world of cooperation, international regimes, communities, laws and norms. In this new world, international relations is not limited to sovereign states in an anarchic world. The focus on agencies in this paper fits well with this tendency in the field.

The field of international relations (IR) has become characterized by two broad debates. One lies between Realism (or neo-Realism) and the rest of the field, with critiques that have broadened beyond their original location in neo-liberal institutionalism. The second debate concerns rationalism, including neo-liberalism and Realism, and constructivism.

Though couched in rationalist terms, the argument here would rest fairly well with three of these four groups, while it clearly represents a major departure from Realism. Focusing on

agencies as the major actors in IR represents an evolution for neo-liberal approaches that began with the state as actor (i.e., Keohane 1984), but not a radical shift. For constructivists, who tend to be agnostic about the nature of the units, making agencies into central actors does not pose any problems. Rationalists would find little reason to object to the analysis here on principle.

In contrast, Realists would object strongly. They would doubtless insist that the problems of anarchy, and the resulting need for self-help in order to maintain a state's security, make international relations fundamentally different from interagency cooperation in domestic politics. This objection rests on the nature of the security *issue*, and not on the nature of the relevant *unit*. This objection essentially grants my central point. The question is not whether defense policy is different from employment policy—of course it is. The question is whether agencies that manage foreign policy are qualitatively different than agencies that manage domestic policy. I deny this latter point, and suggest that if we look more closely at agencies as actors in international relations many of our assumptions about the nature of international politics may not survive close scrutiny.

Going further, in all the cases discussed above public land managers do not differ substantially from nation-states: both types units are territorially defined and claim a monopoly of authority over people who are physically present in that territory.[4] It is true that the nation-state delegates this territorial monopoly to the land management agencies, while the international community's attribution of territorial "sovereignty" has elements of both delegation and non-delegation. This paper has emphasized the similarities between the two types of territorial authority to see how useful an assumption of similarity would be. We need not *assume* that the

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[4]The monopoly of authority over persons physically present comes with some caveats for Indian reservations and Native reserves in North America.

two types of territorial authority are decisively different simply out of habit. The question is instead which assumption will prove to be more powerful.[5] This paper suggests that a research agenda examining the extent to which different types of territorial authority matter for the problem of "cooperation" would indeed be a fruitful one.

What would such an agenda examine? Whereas Allison (1969) saw bureaucracies as central players, he emphasized how these agencies struggled over control of foreign policy in a single state. I would drop the "foreign policy" step entirely, and examine the relations between bureaucracies of different countries directly. It is certainly an open question whether US trade negotiations with China are affected by input from the Defense Department; if not, then looking solely at the US Trade Representative and China's trade ministry should suffice.

An alternative, equally domestic approach to cooperation would focus not on agencies' supply of cooperation but on societal actors that demand such cooperation. Many environmental groups organize to demand transboundary cooperation because the most public land units do not follow ecological boundaries (see *inter alia* Keiter 1988; Salwasser 1988; Varley 1988). For example, the Sonoran Desert ecosystem straddles the United States and Mexico, leading a coalition of groups to form the International Sonoran Desert Alliance (ISDA) to lobby for transboundary preservation. Similarly, advocates in the Yellowstone to Yukon (Y2Y) initiative (Chester 2006; see also www.y2y.net) recommend preservation of the entire Rocky ecosystem from Wyoming north to Alaska, with special focus on wildlife corridors between existing populations and protected areas. Despite their apparent importance, variation in NGO demands does not seem associated with variation in TBC, though the question probably warrants further

[5]Of course, the *ultima ratio* of force is absent in domestic TBC, and land management agencies do not go to war with each other. It is hard to see how this matters for elk management or for most other issue areas, however.

investigation. Much of this lobbying also takes place through the relevant land-management agencies, so that a focus on agencies is probably best. On this view, agencies play a central role as the object of political action, a fact seen in the way that hearings, environmental impact statements, and other administrative processes structure community involvement (for a critical view relevant to the issues in this paper, see Clark et al. 2000).

All such research points toward a need to break down the boundaries between "international" and "domestic" politics. Such a recasting of the field would also find resonance in security studies. For example, once the international/domestic divide is set aside, we can acknowledge that the study of civil war belongs solidly in the field of conflict studies, with no need for excuses such as the prevalence of "foreign" intervention in many civil wars. The field of EU studies has already taken significant steps to analyze "international relations" as consisting of domestic, national and supranational actors (see *inter alia* Hix 1999). It is time for the rest of the field to do likewise.

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